This paper examines Kant's 'orientation' for political thought and the way in which it sets up a normative temporal hierarchy between different peoples and different histories. It examines the question of whether and 'orientation without orientalism' within cosmopolitical theory is possible through a contrast between Habermas's cosmopolitanism and Connolly's immanent naturalism. It concludes that it is only when cosmopolitical thought becomes heterotemporally oriented that the aspiration to cosmopolitan scope for ethical and political claims will be met.
Introduction
--other cultures do not initially confront us as alien societies, since their structures remind us of previous phases of our own social development. 2 Habermas makes the above comment in a discussion about the different points of view from which western culture encounters its others and vice versa in the contemporary world. Whereas non-western cultures experience the west as an overarching global power, a threatening future, western culture experiences the nonwest as a reminder of its own past. The idea of non-simultaneity in the encounter between west and non-west is a common point of view, one that has become deeply ingrained in much of western thought. 3 Moreover, it is frequently enmeshed with a different claim. As Barry Hindess points out there are two characteristic tendencies in western social and political thought: one is the tendency to assign (non-western)
contemporaries to the world of the past; the other is the tendency to consign those belonging to the past to the realm of moral and intellectual failure. 4 This paper argues that these twin tendencies are embedded in the response to the problem of 'orientation' in thought first posed and answered by Kant in a way that has continued to shape contemporary cosmopolitical thinking. This is the problem of the impossibility of perspectiveless thinking faced by the political philosopher committed to the moral law. The paper goes on to argue that as long as a Kantian solution to the problem of orientation in thought holds sway in contemporary cosmopolitical theories then such theories will fail to achieve the cosmopolitical reach to which they aspire.
The progressive impact and timeliness of such attempts to address issues of global rights and justice are undermined by a presumed, but rarely acknowledged, asymmetrical structure in the ethico-political relation between political theorists of cosmopolitan rights and justice and the majority of the global audience to whom, or on behalf of whom, their arguments are, directly or indirectly, addressed.
In what follows, I examine the link between the two tendencies identified by
Hindess, that is to say, the link between understandings of socio-political time and normative, prescriptive claims. My interest is in political theories that seek to address normative cosmopolitical questions about universal human rights, humanitarian intervention, global distributive justice and cosmopolitan democracy. 5 My aim is to establish how it might be possible for political theory to be orientated in relation to the cosmopolitical present(s), without the orientalism targeted in Hindess's analysis. 6 I begin with a return to Kant, who poses and resolves the problem of orientation in thinking in a way that has been particularly influential on later theorizations of world politics. I will argue that Kant's claim as to the necessity of orientation in thinking speaks to the impossibilityof judgement from nowhere, at the same time as it dissimulates this impossibility. It accomplishes this through a posited connection between Kant's home in thought (enlightenment Europe) and an 'as if' end of history. This entanglement of temporal and normative assumptions makes timely judgment in Kant's political theory possible. This is the kind of judgment that aims to make a (normatively) positive difference to the world, by contributing to the progressive tendencies of the present. It is this kind of judgment that is at stake in most contemporary scholarship concerned with normative cosmopolitical questions.
In the second and third sections of the article, I move on to examine two contemporary cosmopolitical theorists with progressive political agendas, Habermas 7 He then draws out an analogy between orientation in relation to objects that can be experienced in space and time (sun, moon etc.) and orientation in judgments for which no intuition of the object is possible, such as in the case of the existence of God. 8 In the case of the latter, nothing can be known about the reality of the object of judgment:
It is at this point, however, that the right of the need of reason supervenes as a subjective ground for presupposing and accepting something which reason cannot presume to know on objective grounds, and hence for orientating ourselves in thought -i.e. in the immeasurable space of the supra-sensory realm which we see as full of utter darknesspurely by means of the need to reason itself. 9 Kant goes on to distinguish between theoretical and practical judgments that exceed the realm of the objects of possible experience. In the case of the former, we may wish to pass judgment on the ultimate causes of things and thus end up invoking the existence of God. But this is not something we are obliged to do. In the case of the latter, we are compelled to pass judgment, in order for the highest good of morality, implied by the moral law, not to be simply an ideal. 10 According to Kant, reason does not feel, yet 'it perceives its own deficiency and produces a feeling of need through the cognitive impulse' 11 . This feeling of need is rational belief, subjectively certain but not objectively grounded. Rational belief in God, as the independent highest good, operates as 'the signpost or compass by means of which the speculative thinker can orientate himself on his rational wanderings in the field of supra-sensory objects', and it operates as a guide to the thought and action of ordinary men (not philosophers). 12 Kant's focus in the essay is on the pitfalls of treating the existence of God as a demonstrable, theoretical truth. 13 But his argument has broader implications, since it speaks to the practical requirement for a particular kind of connection to be drawn between phenomenal and noumenal realms. Subjective certainty of the existence of God is not necessary to authorise moral truths or to motivate moral action, but it is, on Kant's account, necessary to provide a sense of moral direction for the moral subject. 14 A kind of subjective feeling, analogous to the capacity to tell left from right, anchors and enables accurate moral navigation in the phenomenal realm.
The importance of orientation in thinking for Kant, is evident in a variety of his writings on practical philosophy, including his anthropology and ethics. 15 It plays a particularly significant role in his works on history and politics, in which Kant offers us a story of how nature, freewill and reason work complementarily to produce culture that, over time, ensures both juridical and moral progress for mankind. 16 For Kant, nature supplies crucial ingredients of human history, from climate to instinctual drives, but these must not be confused with either freewill or with the human capacity to identify the requirements of autonomous reason and develop a genuinely rational (moral) will. According to Kant's argument, the catalysts of desire and reason work along parallel, mutually reinforcing tracks. 17 On the one hand, man's 'unsociable sociability' drives co-operation within and between states via competitive mechanisms. On the other hand, reason has the power to transform a 'pathologically enforced' union into a 'moral whole'.
These two kinds of stories, driven by distinctive principles, run through Kant's philosophy of right and his philosophical histories. 18 In 'Perpetual Peace: a philosophical sketch', as well as in various speculative accounts of the origins and ends of human history, Kant links the possibility of progress specifically to the development of a certain kind of republican state, as well as to the implications of the practices of both commerce and war. 19 For Kant, therefore, choices based on both desire and reason drive history towards a condition of republican states, linked together in an ordered international society which recognises levels of state, international and cosmopolitan right. Nevertheless, it is also clear that Kant's projected telos of perpetual peace can only be realised through the exercise of human will, which is reducible to neither natural nor rational determination. Kant therefore has a difficulty accounting for his assurance that the exercise of human will will actually follow the prescribed direction, whether willy-nilly (through the clash of interests and the pursuit of desire) or self-consciously (through the embrace of the moral law). Kant addresses this difficulty through a return to the question of orientation.
In essays such as, 'An Old Question Raised Again: is the human race continually progressing?' 20 and 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose' 21 ,
Kant differentiates his philosophy of history from a type of philosophical investigation into the principles governing historical development. In both essays he points to the impossibility of discerning an ethical direction (progressive, retrogressive, static) to human history on the basis of empirical evidence. He identifies this as a problem of perspective: 'If the course of human affairs seems so senseless to us, perhaps it lies in a poor choice of position from which we regard it' 22 .
The ideal position would be 'the standpoint of Providence', beyond history, from which the future can be seen (known). But this is not a standpoint available to human beings, so we need some other way of orientating ourselves, a signpost or rational belief that will enable judgment.
As with the existence of God 'the right of the need of reason' to assume progress in history is required in order to make the highest good something more than a mere ideal. In order to fulfil reason's requirement of orientation in relation to world history and politics, Kant goes on to identify an event in empirical history that points to the 'disposition and capacity of the human race to be the cause of its own advance towards the better' 23 . Not the French Revolution itself, but the sympathy it inspired in disinterested spectators of the revolution, that is to say the feelings of enlightened men, philosophers.
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The philosopher cannot be sure of what, if anything, propels the 'arbitrary play of human freedom', therefore he cannot be sure that empirical history is actually developing teleologically towards the 'perfect civil union of mankind'. Because of this, it is necessary for the philosopher to interpret history as if it had a purpose in keeping with a rational, moral will. On the one hand, this keeps the hope of progress alive, but even more importantly, the judgement of history as if it were progress testifies to the ends of reason in the rational belief of the philosopher. Thus the historical intervention of the philosopher's judgment can be cited to confirm the truth of his diagnosis of his own times and of the forces shaping history, even as he denies his ability to demonstrate a pattern of progress in the inchoate mess of empirical political events.
The political task of philosophical history is to intervene in the empirical, to influence the judgement of leaders and populations, to encourage enlightenment and the self-conscious implementation of the political project of republican government and perpetual peace. The relation between past, present and future prescribed in Kant's philosophical history is effectively guaranteed only by the degree to which the philosopher's orientation is shared with others. This is an orientation that fuses, in the rational belief of the philosopher, the time of enlightenment in Europe as experienced and witnessed in Kőnigsberg, with the 'immeasurable time' of the highest good. This rational belief, a feeling that is no feeling, is also the affective core of being Kant the philosophical spectator. And being Kant, or being like Kant, makes possible the kinds of readings of history that will contribute towards world-historical progress.
Kant's orientation for thinking world politics is premised on the theoretical impossibility of 'seeing' from 'nowhere' coupled with the practical necessity to do precisely this. This paradox is resolved through the subjective certainty of the thinker that history must be read as if it were progress. This means that when it comes to orientation in thinking about world politics, it is a question of space, time and a consequent timeliness embodied in the philosopher himself. The orientation in terms of sympathetic reaction to the French Revolution operates so as to unify the space/time of the world (this is not about one nation but about all nations). This is world-historical and world-political time, it is also the present, a global 'now' with implications for all future presents that are only fully apparent to the philosopher, whose interventions in debate are therefore timely in a way that holds genuine promise for the future. The philosophical spectator takes on the role, and also the obligations, of Providence.
In terms of its implications for cosmopolitan political theory, whether explanatory of normative, Kant's orientation for political thinking organizes the world, spatially, temporally and morally in a particular way. The world of nations acquires a centre and a future in which the highest good is manifested. Peripheral places become identified with temporal as well as spatial distance, backward in the progressive workings of history. But this spatio-temporal distance is also a moral distance. The fusion of noumenal and phenomenal worlds in the subjective certainty of the spectators of the French Revolution testifies to their capacities for moral navigation, capacities that are in principle inherent in all rational beings, not just German philosophers. On Kant's own account, though it is somewhat ambiguous when it comes to women and other races, no adult humans fall outside of the category of rational being. 25 To the extent that others do not orientate their thought along Kantian lines, then they are in some kind of error. Two sorts of error are possible on Kant's account of the human condition. There are wilful errors, in which rational beings knowingly act wrongly, and for which they should therefore be held responsible, in which case the vocabularies of guilt, shame and punishment are appropriate. But there are also inadvertent errors that follow from ignorance and immaturity, in which case, as with children, education is the answer. 26 This means that spatio-temporally distant people and peoples, from the perspective of the rational belief of the philosopher, precisely because they are moral equals are a priori identified as in need of either punishment or education to set them right. constitutions, organizations and procedures. 29 Habermas explains this historical trend as the product of collective learning processes of a double kind. 30 These learning processes reflect the lesson of the horrors of war but also the lesson learned within the modern constitutional state that law, properly understood, rationalizes power in a normatively positive way. 31 It is the latter lesson that is most crucial, since it demonstrates the connection in principle between law and peace. 32 Habermas reads the idea that there is a conceptual connection between peace and law back into the logical and historical implications of international law, which, he argues, have become increasingly, though still inadequately, constitutionalized during the twentieth century. He departs from Kant, however, in refusing the two options he (Kant) presents for the telos of inter-state relations, that of constitution as a world republic on the one hand, 33 and that of the 'league or confederation of nations' on the other 34 . Instead, Habermas goes on to build on Kant's analysis in a different way, arguing that the constitutionalization of international law is complementary rather than analogous to the constitutionalization of law within the state. 35 According to Habermas, the kind of constitution already implicit in supranational and transnational organizations implies a multi-level system of authority. He sees the constitutions (founding treaties and charters) of existing organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and, above all, the European Union, as foreshadowing the shape that such a multi-level constitutionalized global order is likely to take. 36 Habermas's adaptation of the 'Kantian project' attempts to draw out the logic implicit in the idea of law, but, as with Kant, goes beyond the realm of the 'idea' by identifying signposts within empirical history, specifically the empirical history of Western modernity. As with Kant also, however, Habermas is insistent that the necessary links between law and peace may not be empirically realised within the workings of historical time and that this therefore necessitates (makes the theorist responsible for) reading history from a cosmopolitan point of view. 37 The First World thus defines so to speak the meridian of a present by which the political simultaneity of economic and cultural nonsimultaneity is measured. 42 The idea of 'non-simultaneity', which Habermas uses to describe the differential sociopolitical realities of 'first', 'second' and 'third' world states in contemporary world politics is heavily normatively laden. 43 To be 'non-simultaneous' with OECD countries, that is to say backward in relation to those countries, is to be out of step with progress in history, not purely on grounds of capacity, but also on grounds of political mentality. This does not mean that liberal democratic states always act rightly, it means rather that such states have special responsibilities, which reflect their particular capacity for timeliness, in an incomplete cosmopolitan condition. Two examples of such responsibilities to which Habermas draws attention are those of humanitarian intervention and cross-cultural dialogue. In relation to the former, Habermas is fully alive to the potential for powerful liberal democratic states, in the absence of a fully constitutionalized international order, to use doctrines of humanitarian intervention or 'responsibility to protect' in order to serve their own interests. Nevertheless, ultimately, it is only such states that can be trusted to undertake such actions, because these are the only states that have, as it were, subjectively internalised an orientation towards the universal end of history.
When there is no other way, democratic neighbouring states must be permitted to intervene in an emergency in accordance with customary international law. But in such cases the incompleteness of the cosmopolitan condition demands exceptional sensitivity.
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Something similar applies when it comes to cross-cultural dialogue. Habermas is fully sensible of the dangers of Western cultural imperialism, but he is also convinced that the orientation of the global world-historical present remains 'the essentially unchanging horizon of social modernity and the associated normative self-understanding which developed after the end of the eighteenth century' 45 . And until such time as the rest of the world catches up,
Habermas is also clear that it is only within Western culture that the resources can be found for resisting Western cultural imperialism; 'overcoming Eurocentrism demands that the West make proper use of its own cognitive resources' 46 Of course, one way of responding to this would be to simply dismiss the claim that practical reason requires orientation, and to work to demonstrate how particular ethical/ political perspectives correspond to a 'view from nowhere'. On this account, political theory does not and
should not rely on any kind of claim that is not rationally demonstrable regardless of the subjective certainties of either the theorist or the audience to which his or her claims are addressed. Which would mean that the claims of the right (correct) kind of political theory are always true and always timely. Contemporary cosmopolitan theories that take their cue from
Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals or Critique of Practical Reason rather than
from his writings on judgment, history, politics and anthropology, tend to assume an unmediated application of the rational (noumenal) to the phenomenal world. 48 With the result that they are compelled to identify those out of step with the requirements of reason as irrational or wicked rather than backward or misled. But whether one takes a more or less thoroughly rationalist account of moral and political theory, the repertoire of possibilities for relating to those not at home in the theorists' convictions is asymmetrical and hierarchical and does not disturb the presumption that the theorist possesses the authoritative key to the cosmopolitical present(s).
Across the spectrum of cosmopolitanisms, prescriptive theories of global ethics and politics are built on the assumption that a large part of the world's population is, at best, a junior, and largely where he characterizes the time of thinking as an 'out of joint' emergence and coming together of a range of virtual pasts in relation to an ongoing, given present which yields a previously unpredictable future. 50 Connolly argues that the asymmetries in the temporality of thinking, which perpetually destabilize and transform the temporal organization of pasts, presents and chronologies. 53 This leads him to distinguish between two different sorts of temporality association with a 'politics of being' on the one hand, and a 'politics of becoming' on the other.
A political temporality of being refers to relatively stable contexts for political judgment and action, on the basis of which one can extrapolate the meaning of progress in accordance with given, sedimented criteria. In contrast, the political temporality of becoming refers to shifting and unfamiliar contexts for political judgment and action, where criteria for the meaning of progress must be negotiated without the certainties embedded in a politics of being. hierarchically. To live up to the best inscribed in your own present, and which you know to be the direction in which history should be treated as travelling, is different than to be obliged to overcome your present in order to live up to a putative, alien future. It's not that the western theorist cannot be wrong or guilty, but to the extent that he or she is mistaken or wicked, it is because he or she fails to live up to his or her own standards, to be punished or corrected is to come home, not to be expelled from home. On this account, affective disturbance, at the level of harmony on these issues, but from the viewpoint of heterotemporality this is something to be discovered rather than assumed.
Within predominant contemporary diagnoses of, and prescriptions for, world politics the problem is not that the co-existence of a plurality of orientations goes unrecognised, so much as that the meaning of this plurality is always already homogenised by reference to the authoritative space/time of western modernity. It is the subjective certainty of this orientation that not only grounds the theorist's judgment but also enables it to make a difference in practice, through timely prescription and through example. Connolly's argument holds out the promise of a different kind of timeliness for ethical and political thought, one that renders the work of the theorist less heroic and less certainly effective. Instead of being the one who already knows the time, the heterotemporally oriented theorist is fundamentally uncertain of his own punctuality.
The extent to which his interventions are or are not timely will depend on the moral/temporal certainties and uncertainties (orientations) of his interlocutors. And any making of the times will necessarily be a collaborative enterprise.
